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	<title type="text">Yael Grauer | The Verge</title>
	<subtitle type="text">The Verge is about technology and how it makes us feel. Founded in 2011, we offer our audience everything from breaking news to reviews to award-winning features and investigations, on our site, in video, and in podcasts.</subtitle>

	<updated>2026-06-20T16:31:42+00:00</updated>

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		<entry>
			
			<author>
				<name>Yael Grauer</name>
			</author>
			
			<title type="html"><![CDATA[Read this before you vibe-code another app]]></title>
			<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.theverge.com/ai-artificial-intelligence/950844/vibe-coding-security-risks-apps" />
			<id>https://www.theverge.com/?p=950844</id>
			<updated>2026-06-20T12:31:42-04:00</updated>
			<published>2026-06-22T07:00:00-04:00</published>
			<category scheme="https://www.theverge.com" term="AI" /><category scheme="https://www.theverge.com" term="Tech" />
							<summary type="html"><![CDATA[Bob Starr was delighted with his vibe-coded website. “Boomberg” showed how much US tax money is going to tech companies, and Starr launched it online immediately after making it. It wasn’t until months after the site went live that he realized there was a problem: a hidden SQL injection risk. It could’ve left the site [&#8230;]]]></summary>
			
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<img alt="An illustration of a laptop coding in front of green code and it’s melting" data-caption="" data-portal-copyright="Image: Cath Virginia / The Verge, Getty Images" data-has-syndication-rights="1" src="https://platform.theverge.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2026/06/268570_vibe_coding_security_CVirginia2.jpg?quality=90&#038;strip=all&#038;crop=0,0,100,100" />
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<p class="has-drop-cap has-text-align-none">Bob Starr was delighted with his vibe-coded website. <a href="https://boomberg.xyz/" data-type="link" data-id="https://boomberg.xyz/">“Boomberg”</a> showed how much US tax money is going to tech companies, and Starr launched it online immediately after making it. It wasn’t until months after the site went live that he realized there was a problem: a hidden SQL injection risk. It could’ve left the site open for an attacker to read or alter data they shouldn’t have access to.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">“It was just a glaring oversight on my part. It was a complete blindspot in my state of learning this new technology and understanding it, and I’m sure there are others making the same mistake,” said Starr, a project manager in the tech sector.</p>

<figure class="wp-block-pullquote"><blockquote><p>“It was a complete blindspot in my state of learning this new technology and understanding it.”</p></blockquote></figure>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Starr fixed the issue, but he isn’t alone. Across social media, there are horror stories about vibe-coded apps full of security vulnerabilities. Jer Crane, founder of PocketOS, posted on X <a href="https://x.com/lifeof_jer/status/2048103471019434248?s=46">about an AI coding agent</a> wiping out his company’s production database. Joe Procopio, a serial entrepreneur and former developer, <a href="https://www.inc.com/joe-procopio/vibe-coding-was-a-ruse-to-sell-ai-coding-to-the-enterprise/91293969">vibe-coded a web app</a> to privately show demos of other apps he’d built. Hackers came, so he took the app down. “Now I do demos the old fashioned way, from my local machine over Zoom,” he wrote. “It’s sooo 2023.”</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">We’ve entered a new <a href="https://www.theverge.com/tech/928905/vibe-code-personal-software-revolution">“era of personal software,”</a><em> </em>as <em>The Verge</em>’s David Pierce said, where anyone can use AI to create their own private apps that can do exactly what they want. But with it comes a new era of security issues. Apps may be easy to build, but they’re difficult to secure —&nbsp;especially in a world where AI can also be used to attack them.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">&#8220;My general core take is that vibe coding is not bad because amateurs can build software. That&#8217;s actually the good part,&#8221; says Gabriel Bernadett-Shapiro, distinguished AI research scientist at AI-powered cybersecurity firm SentinelOne.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">The danger, he says, is when a personal app drifts into the realm of business software and stores shared, hosted data without anybody realizing that shift has happened. And, he says, the calculus changes when vibe coding moves away from local apps for tracking migraines or meals or package deliveries and enters the realm of apps that handle customer logs, medical data, financial records, or internal documents.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">&#8220;Those need to be held to a different standard. Even if it was built by one person in an afternoon. Even if the software creating the software was trivial. The moment that it touches other people&#8217;s personal data, then that&#8217;s when I think the standard changes.&#8221;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Jack Cable, CEO and cofounder of Corridor (the security platform built for AI-native software development), agrees.&nbsp;</p>

<figure class="wp-block-pullquote"><blockquote><p>“Vibe coding is not bad because amateurs can build software. That&#8217;s actually the good part.&#8221;</p></blockquote></figure>

<p class="has-text-align-none">“Vibe coding is great for lower risk things,” Cable says, such as a prototype, or a fitness tracker that isn’t super sensitive. But financial records deserve more scrutiny, he says, as does anything on the public internet. “Are you exposing any of your own or other people&#8217;s data there?” he asked. “Think through what the threat model looks like, and if you&#8217;re not sure if something you&#8217;re doing is secure, better safe than sorry.”</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">That is what Max Segall, chief operating officer at the crypto wallet firm Privy, had done after he vibe-coded EzRun as a fun way of rewarding his kid with $10 in Ethereum every time the two went running together. Thankfully, a colleague found a critical flaw that would have let anyone modify user accounts to gain access — before launch.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">In a more concerning and high-profile case in late January, a developer named Matt Schlicht launched a viral social network called Moltbook. It was built entirely for AI agents, and he <a href="https://x.com/MattPRD/status/2017386365756072376">did not write</a> a single line of code. Within days, researchers at the security firm Wiz says <a href="https://www.wiz.io/blog/exposed-moltbook-database-reveals-millions-of-api-keys">it found the app’s entire production database wide open</a>, exposing tens of thousands of email addresses and private messages. Moltbook patched the bug shortly after being told about it, but this wasn’t a one-off. <em>Wired</em> reported that <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/thousands-of-vibe-coded-apps-expose-corporate-and-personal-data-on-the-open-web/">researchers at cybersecurity firm Red Access found roughly 5,000 publicly accessible apps</a> built with popular vibe-coding tools that had no authentication, and close to 2,000 of those appeared to be leaking sensitive data like medical and financial information, strategy documents, and even logs of chatbot conversations.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">To be fair, plenty of professionally made pre-AI software is woefully insecure, too. But just as vibe coding exponentially increases the number of apps being produced, the number of security risks is also likely skyrocketing. And it adds the risk of overconfidence. When an AI tool tells you code is secure, it’s easy to believe it.&nbsp;</p>

<figure class="wp-block-pullquote"><blockquote><p>“If you&#8217;re not sure if something you&#8217;re doing is secure, better safe than sorry.”</p></blockquote></figure>

<p class="has-text-align-none">And in a normal vibe-coding session, nothing stops to check on its own unless you’ve installed something that has, which most casual coders have not. The build just keeps going. The security tools that exist have to be invoked. While Claude Code has a /security-review command that scans for vulnerabilities, you have to ask it to do so. There’s an automatic version, but only if you <a href="https://claude.com/blog/automate-security-reviews-with-claude-code">set it up</a> <a href="https://support.claude.com/en/articles/11932705-automated-security-reviews-in-claude-code">to run on pull requests</a> in advance, which is something that most casual builders aren’t doing.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">OpenAI’s own coding agent Codex has a built-in security agent, Codex Security, that scans commits as they land and re-scans its own proposed patches, but it’s aimed at developers with real version-control workflows, not someone chatting an app into existence. For everyone else, the takeaway is simple: You have to prompt for security up front when you build, and again at the end, especially, any time the tool has access to data you care about.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">“A lot of security is contextual,” Cable says, so while it definitely doesn&#8217;t hurt to run a coding agent’s own review, he cautions against having a false sense of security from it, especially when the agent doesn’t understand your threat model, or you haven’t given it the correct guidance.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Bernadett-Shapiro says that his biggest concern is not buggy AI-generated code, but a lack of authentication, something developers may not think about when they transition an app they run locally into the cloud with a bunch of configuration options they don’t understand, leading to sensitive data being exposed. This is the failure that worries him most, and for good reason: Apps that run fine locally put on the cloud can be like leaving a box of secrets open on the sidewalk — something researchers keep finding.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">AI is good at finding bugs when prompted. There have been improvements in models with things like Mythos, the same Anthropic model that set off alarm bells for how easily it finds vulnerabilities to attack, which can also be used to harden apps vibe coders are building. Bernadett-Shapiro says GPT-5.5-Cyber, or even the base models of other applications, can assess the security and identify issues in an app that even a skilled developer may have looked over. Of course, he points out that people may not understand security tradeoffs they’re making or even ignore warnings as acceptable risk.</p>

<figure class="wp-block-pullquote"><blockquote><p>“A lot of security is contextual.”</p></blockquote></figure>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Some of the scaffolding is starting to exist. OWASP, the nonprofit behind many web security standards, has published <a href="https://github.com/OWASP/AISVS">an AI security verification standard</a> aimed at organizations. Firms like Trail of Bits have started releasing “skills,” add-on instruction packs that point a coding agent at specific security tasks, like flagging insecure default settings or hardcoded passwords before they ship. Skills have to be specifically triggered, so they don’t fit very naturally into the flow of development, Cable says, and it&#8217;s hard to keep them updated and synchronized across coding agents and as the codebase changes.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Beyond that, skills can cut both ways, because malicious skills also exist.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">In February, 1Password’s Jason Meller examined the most downloaded skill on a popular OpenClaw skill registry and <a href="https://1password.com/blog/from-magic-to-malware-how-openclaws-agent-skills-become-an-attack-surface">found that it directed users to install a dependency that ended up being malicious itself</a>. It’s still the Wild West out there and can be difficult to tell whether a skill will harden your app or hand an attacker your credentials.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">The potential of insecure vibe-coded apps isn’t a problem limited to hobbyists. Cable says engineers and even sales and marketing teams at big companies are now shipping far more agent-written code than before. Security teams need baseline visibility into how the agents are being used, he says, as well as guardrails that get enforced — either through skills or through products like the one Corridor sells, which aim to stop flaws before the code is even written.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">For individuals, Cable’s guidelines are much simpler: Be aware that a model running locally on your own computer is far less risky than one made public, especially if it contains sensitive data.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">“Literally overnight, the way most companies produce software has changed completely,” Cable says. He’s not especially worried about the coding agents themselves as long as they’re given the right guardrails in which to operate. The models themselves are increasingly built on a memory-safe stack that eliminates entire classes of vulnerabilities to begin with. “I do think there is reason to be optimistic here,” he says.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Government affairs specialist Jeff Rothblum vibe-coded an app for tackling mountains of tedious data entry with security in mind. He thought about what information the app holds, how sensitive it is, and what could happen if it got out. It’s a striking approach because it is so rare, and because the ground beneath us is shifting so quickly.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">While working as head of government affairs and strategy at Lilt, he had to submit input forms to various government committees to get ideas into appropriations bills. No two forms are alike, so lobbyists may submit dozens or even hundreds of unique ones in a six-week period. After eight 75-hour weeks, and a layoff, he built a tool in case he ever had to do this again. It’s an app that scrapes links and due dates into a single dashboard and uses an LLM to prepopulate each form, so users only need to review and edit it (and paste in an account number) before submitting.</p>

<figure class="wp-block-pullquote"><blockquote><p>Vibe-code the app of your dreams, but think through what data the app is storing and has access to and what could go wrong.</p></blockquote></figure>

<p class="has-text-align-none">He was well aware of the risk because he didn’t write his own code. &#8220;The last time I wrote code was probably in undergrad in 2006 writing Fortran to analyze fluid flows as an aerospace engineer,&#8221; Rothblum told <em>The Verge</em>. The biggest risk is that companies could inadvertently leak strategies or sensitive lobbying rationale, which stay private even when the filings are public. He’s mitigating this risk by running regular security reviews in Claude, keeping user data local rather than on his servers and building toward stricter retention safeguards.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">He has vibe-coded his app to clear the browser and is upfront about the page sending data to Claude, linking to its retention policy. He’s working on a version of the app in which nothing a user types is stored by AI, even briefly, and a separate version that would let users route everything through their own LLM rather than his Claude instance.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">While Rothblum has thought of building a broader lobbying intelligence tool, he says that if he does start working with more sensitive data, he intends to shell out four to five figures to pay an actual security engineer to review his code.”I’m happy with open-source stuff and I&#8217;m happy with ephemeral stuff, but everything else kind of scares me,” he says.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">It is ideal to have a human expert review code, but Cable says that’s becoming a bottleneck. The open question, he says, is what the world looks like when most code ships without any human reading it and how we secure that world.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">For now, the answer for the rest of us is smaller and more within reach: Vibe-code the app of your dreams, but think through what data the app is storing and has access to and what could go wrong. Ask it to build it with security in mind, and run code reviews after each change, including the patches the AI writes itself. Pay extra close attention before you move it from your own device into the cloud or give it access to any sensitive data or accounts. The difference between a fun project and a horror story starts with knowing what questions to ask.&nbsp;</p>
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			<entry>
			
			<author>
				<name>Yael Grauer</name>
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			<title type="html"><![CDATA[Attack of the killer script kiddies]]></title>
			<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://www.theverge.com/ai-artificial-intelligence/915660/mythos-script-kiddies-hackers-attack-cybersecurity-ai" />
			<id>https://www.theverge.com/?p=915660</id>
			<updated>2026-04-28T08:29:07-04:00</updated>
			<published>2026-04-28T07:00:00-04:00</published>
			<category scheme="https://www.theverge.com" term="AI" /><category scheme="https://www.theverge.com" term="Security" /><category scheme="https://www.theverge.com" term="Tech" />
							<summary type="html"><![CDATA[Last August, some of the best cybersecurity teams in the business gathered in Las Vegas to demonstrate the strength of their AI bug-finding systems at DARPA&#8217;s Artificial Intelligence Cyber Challenge (AIxCC). The tools had scanned 54 million lines of actual software code that DARPA had injected with artificial flaws. The teams were capable enough to [&#8230;]]]></summary>
			
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<img alt="" data-caption="" data-portal-copyright="Joseph Rogers / The Verge" data-has-syndication-rights="1" src="https://platform.theverge.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2026/04/rogers-script-kiddies-ANIMATION.gif?quality=90&#038;strip=all&#038;crop=0,0,100,100" />
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<p class="has-drop-cap has-text-align-none">Last August, some of the best cybersecurity teams in the business gathered in Las Vegas to demonstrate the strength of their AI bug-finding systems at DARPA&#8217;s Artificial Intelligence Cyber Challenge (AIxCC). The tools had scanned 54 million lines of actual software code that DARPA had injected with artificial flaws. The teams were capable enough to identify most of the artificial bugs, but their automated tools went beyond that — they found more than a dozen bugs that DARPA hadn’t inserted at all.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Even before the security earthquake that Anthropic delivered this month with Claude Mythos — the new AI model that seems to find vulnerabilities in every piece of software it’s pointed at — automated systems were growing increasingly capable of finding coding flaws. And fears are growing that not only can AI detect these flaws, but also be used to exploit them, putting hacking skills into the hands of everyone across the planet.</p>

<figure class="wp-block-pullquote"><blockquote><p>“Mythos or not, this is coming.”</p></blockquote></figure>

<p class="has-text-align-none">This isn&#8217;t an empty threat. For decades, this type of no-skill hacker, known as a script kiddie, has wreaked havoc, running scripts they ripped from the internet or copied from exploit tool kits. They didn’t fully understand or have the technical know-how to write these scripts themselves. And yet they were still able to deface websites and propagate viruses.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">What’s happening now represents a major escalation, where people without technical backgrounds are able to use AI to enhance their capabilities in a way that wasn’t possible with simple scripts. It is likely to have far more wide-reaching repercussions.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">&nbsp;“There’s a tidal wave coming. You can see it. We can all see it,” said Dan Guido, CEO and cofounder of cybersecurity firm Trail of Bits, which was a runner-up in the challenge. “Are you going to lay down and die, or are you going to do something about it?”</p>
<img src="https://platform.theverge.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2026/04/rogers-script-kiddies-Spot-1.jpg?quality=90&#038;strip=all&#038;crop=0,0,100,100" alt="" title="" data-has-syndication-rights="1" data-caption="" data-portal-copyright="Image: Joseph Rogers / The Verge" />
<p class="has-drop-cap has-text-align-none">Even beyond Project Glasswing, Anthropic is trying to prevent the misuse of its software by criminals. A week after announcing Mythos, the company released Claude Opus 4.7, which for the first time built in safeguards meant to block malicious cybersecurity requests. (Security professionals who want to use the model defensively can apply to the company’s Cyber Verification Program.)&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Anthropic’s announcement of Mythos sent shockwaves throughout the industry, but there were warning signs of AI’s cybersecurity prowess prior to it. In June 2025, the autonomous offensive security platform XBOW beat out human hackers to top the leaderboard of HackerOne, a bug bounty platform, indicating big leaps in the ability of AI models to find bugs.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">By the time AIxCC rolled around, “there were already 10 to 20 different bug-finding systems that could find orders of multitude more bugs than we could patch,” Guido said. “This is actually not a new problem.”</p>

<figure class="wp-block-pullquote"><blockquote><p>“2026 is the year when all security debt comes due… 2026 is the make-it-or-break-it year.”</p></blockquote></figure>

<p class="has-text-align-none">AI is great at pattern matching, and it’s becoming easier and easier for people to find variants of bugs that are already known and ones that have not yet been discovered. And writing exploits is becoming easier as well.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">“You can use AI tools and with very minimal human guidance, and in some cases no human guidance, find a zero day in widely used software,” said Tim Becker, senior security researcher at Theori, which was also a finalist in the competition.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">The concern is palpable across the industry, and improvements to models — along with improved understanding of their capabilities — are happening at lightning speed.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Open-weight models, or models whose trained parameters (also known as weights) are publicly available, also pose risk. In fact, sophisticated threat actors would be far more likely to run their own deployments to prevent the exploits from being exposed on Anthropic or OpenAI servers, Becker said, as Anthropic <a href="https://developers.openai.com/api/docs/guides/your-data#types-of-data-stored-with-the-openai-api">may retain data to monitor abuse</a>. And the industry is bracing for what may come next. Other model creators may not be as cautious as Anthropic, potentially unleashing their powerful new tools straight to the public.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">“Mythos or not, this is coming,” Guido says.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Mythos represents a step up at writing exploits, but current models are capable, too. Security researchers are already using more widely available models to report vulnerabilities to vendors before they’re exploited in the wild. That means there’s also the risk of malicious actors using them for ill purposes, such as creating exploits for oppressive regimes or stealing sensitive data on their own.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Industry experts predict that the advancement in AI security capabilities is going to lead to a lot more exploits. Bad actors could direct AI to find bugs in uncommon pieces of software that no one previously would have put in the effort to exploit.</p>

<figure class="wp-block-pullquote"><blockquote><p>“The bar to diving into a new million-line codebase and finding a bug is so much lower than it used to be.”</p></blockquote></figure>

<p class="has-text-align-none">“Now, because effort is cheap, you can do things that are lower down the food chain. You can write exploits for software that only one company has. You can write exploits for software that exists in only one configuration that one company has. And you can do it on the fly. So during the middle of an intrusion into some hospital and there’s a wall standing between you and what you want, you can just point an LLM at that wall and say, ‘Figure out a flaw here,’ and it can grind until it’s successful. And it’ll find some vulnerability, it can find some configuration, it’ll run an exploit, for a weakness that no one ever has before, and it’ll do it with almost no effort on the part of the user… the hacker… the script kiddie,” said Guido.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">This supercharges script kiddies, he says, because they’ll be able to operate on their feet without the constraints of memorizing the weaknesses in random UNIX utilities but instead defaulting to the pretraining in the tool they are using.&nbsp; They’ll be able to iterate through exploits targeting weaknesses at machine speed, something that no human — let alone script kiddie — can do.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">It’s hard to determine exactly how much this is improving attacker capabilities, though there definitely <a href="https://ringmast4r.substack.com/p/we-may-be-living-through-the-most">seems to be a correlation</a>. Security researchers can help us try to wrap our heads around the scale of bugs being discovered.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Before Becker started working on automatic bug finding with AI, he worked on vulnerability research, finding zero days and reporting them to maintainers. He said it used to take him weeks or months to find a high-impact vulnerability in a brand-new codebase, and now it only takes hours.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">“I just drop the code into our AI bug-finding tool and in a couple hours I get a report with a bunch of candidate vulnerabilities, and most of them end up checking out and being real issues,” he said. “The bar to diving into a new million-line codebase and finding a bug is so much lower than it used to be.”</p>

<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity" />

<p class="has-drop-cap has-text-align-none">Every release of an automated tool has led to some level of panic about how it might be exploited, whether that’s text-to-image generators or open-source tools like the exploit development and delivery system Metasploit. The panic even goes back to 1995, when a free software vulnerability scanner named<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_Administrator_Tool_for_Analyzing_Networks"> SATAN</a> (an acronym for Security Administrator Tool for Analyzing Networks) was released.&nbsp;</p>

<figure class="wp-block-pullquote"><blockquote><p>“You can just point an LLM at that wall and say, ‘Figure out a flaw here,’ and it can grind until it’s successful.”</p></blockquote></figure>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Often automated tools don’t lead to the same level of mayhem that had been expected or predicted, due to prevention measures put in place, low adoption rates by attackers, or other factors.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Joshua Saxe, CTO and cofounder of Security Superintelligence Labs, <a href="https://joshuasaxe181906.substack.com/p/exploits-dont-cause-cyberattacks">wrote in a blog post</a> that exploits themselves don’t cause cyberattacks, and that adoption of AI vulnerability research tools has been incremental.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">“There seems to be an implicit mental model where some new adversarial tool becomes available&#8230; and therefore we will immediately see criminal behavior with those tools. It’s a kind of mental model where you don’t even have to think about or do any empirical inquiry into what the humans are actually doing,” he told <em>The Verge</em>.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Saxe points out that it’s possible there’ll be friction in various attacker constituencies adopting these tools within their existing workflows and organization cultures.“There’s a whole human and organizational element here,” he said.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">&nbsp;“It may be that there are certain attacker constituencies that are going to jump on these new tools, or it might be that the adoption curve is quite slow.” Some may keep breaking into networks by phishing or using exploits they already have, while others might begin developing new exploits using these tools.&nbsp;</p>
<img src="https://platform.theverge.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2026/04/rogers-script-kiddies-Spot-2.jpg?quality=90&#038;strip=all&#038;crop=0,0,100,100" alt="" title="" data-has-syndication-rights="1" data-caption="" data-portal-copyright="Image: Joseph Rogers / The Verge" />
<p class="has-drop-cap has-text-align-none">While the rate of adoption is impossible to predict, there are steps companies can take to prepare for the coming onslaught of vulnerability reports.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Katie Moussouris, founder and CEO of Luta Security, coined the term “<a href="https://www.lutasecurity.com/post/vulnapalooza-why-anthropic-s-mythos-is-the-loudest-headliner-nobody-bought-tickets-to">Vulnapalooza</a>” in a blog post complete with a concert poster and festival survival guide for security teams, explaining that this is the moment for companies to secure their weaker points. The advice for companies is not different from standard best practices: segmentation, working on identity and access management, using memory-safe code, and using phishing-resistant authentication and up-to-date software.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">The Cloud Security Alliance <a href="https://labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org/mythos-ciso/">released an expedited strategy briefing</a> on developing a “Mythos-ready” security plan detailing many of these concepts. The report also emphasized the need to not only patch vulnerabilities but also to identify which ones to prioritize. But the need to match machine speed threats is new, and the amount of bug reports is already skyrocketing, leading to the need to prepare for more incidents and mitigate and contain them at a faster rate.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Moussouris says that many people in cybersecurity roles have been laid off because of AI’s efficiencies, even though those efficiencies are exactly why more humans need to remain in the mix. Companies will need human threat hunters, threat intelligence officers, and incident responders to deal with the onslaught of new exploits. And they’ll need people to decide which patches to prioritize and implement.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">“We don’t have the AI defensive equivalent to automate all of those tasks, and I think we’re going to need to staff up and hire a lot of people,” she said. And organizations will need to build out secure software and secure architecture for networks to avoid ending up in an endless cycle of patching. “You have to build more secure software in the first place. We can’t incident respond our way to resilience.”&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Organizations that aren’t ready to hire people could at least streamline their vendor onboarding processes to make it easier to bring on people or services as needed. “You don’t want to be stuck in a four-month procurement process for a vendor when you’re under fire and can’t keep up with the patch rollout,” Moussouris said.</p>

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<p class="has-drop-cap has-text-align-none">While many are concerned about vulnerabilities, Moussouris believes the so-called “vulnpocalypse” will actually manifest as a “patchpocalypse.”&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">“The model has already identified thousands of vulnerabilities, and that patch tsunami that’s about to come from this coordination effort, that’s going to be the first major pain point,” she said.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Organizations that are slow to patch their systems may have a rude awakening. Waiting too long risks active attacks on services that target vulnerabilities found by AI, perhaps even using exploits written by the models.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">“From the time a vulnerability is announced to the time where there is exploit code available has now shrunk to pretty much zero, and that is a major adjustment that I think people will have to take into account in their risk assessments and how long they can take to do things and how many resources they are applying towards this problem,” she explained.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">There is an opportunity to use AI to at least speed up the remediation or mitigation process. Becker says that Theori is building a commercial tool called Xint that it’s been running on open-source codebases, manually reporting high-severity findings to maintainers by sending detailed reports along with remediation suggestions on its own dime, both as a community hardening project and to demonstrate the tool’s capabilities. Xint’s current version was <a href="https://go.xint.io/xint-mythos-appsec-findings-report">able to find all the bugs Mythos did</a> when scanning the same codebases. It also found 12 additional zero-day vulnerabilities that were not part of Anthropic’s announcement.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">But mitigating these bugs will not be as quick as finding them because it requires engineers who are extremely familiar with the codebase to determine whether the patches are the best way to fix the issues found or whether they may make the code less maintainable or harder to understand in the future. Sometimes a patch represents a way to fix a problem, but not the best way, so it’ll take human time and effort to get the solutions to the finish line.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">The huge surge in bugs being reported can lead to a long queue of things to patch, especially for <a href="https://xkcd.com/2347/">open-source maintainers</a>, who may be unable to keep up with the load.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">While not all bugs are useful in an attacker’s tool kit, sorting through the pile to determine which ones are a priority to fix can be almost as difficult as fixing them.&nbsp;</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">“A lot of the prioritization needs to be contextual,” Moussouris said. For example, a very bad bug running internally that would be hard for an outsider to access might be lower priority than a less critical bug that is exposed on the company’s perimeter.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Beyond prioritization of bugs, organizations will also need to decide when to apply patches that restrict functionality and may even lead to downtime, and when to wait. The fewer security controls they have in place, the more time they will need for patching.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Simply putting out a patch makes it easier for attackers to reverse engineer the bug fix and exploit vulnerabilities they may have been otherwise unaware of on devices that have not yet been updated. That means that consumers, too, will need to get used to updating their software as critical fixes for security flaws increase dramatically. And organizations will want to invest in secure architecture to minimize the amount of patches they need to manage in the first place.</p>

<figure class="wp-block-pullquote"><blockquote><p>“The thing is, it’s now or never. There’s a tidal wave coming.”</p></blockquote></figure>

<p class="has-text-align-none">But as Moussouris frames it, it doesn&#8217;t have to be a reason to despair. “You don’t have to treat it like this is going to be the worst thing that ever happened,” she told <em>The Verge</em>. “You can treat it like, this is our opportunity to shore up some defenses and get some budget to do things we’ve been putting off.”</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">Whatever attitude organizations take, they need to be prepared. The stakes are higher, and even script kiddies have a lot more opportunities to find and exploit vulnerabilities. Companies need a plan to deal with this new threat of AI-enabled attacks.</p>

<p class="has-text-align-none">“2026 is the make-it-or-break-it year,” Guido said. Companies need to secure their systems now, while they still have time to get ahead. “And if they don’t do that, we’re going to end 2026 with everything on fire.”&nbsp;</p>
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