Sean Hollister

So unhappy that he’s considering a mandatory jury instruction — which might tell the jury not to trust Google as much as they otherwise might — unless Google’s chief legal officer Kent Walker shows up Thursday at 3PM PT and can properly explain this mess.

➼ Offering Android for free helps Google compete with Apple because other companies can focus on building the hardware and apps instead of a whole operating system

➼ MADA includes tools that help devs make higher-quality apps

➼ Google’s APIs ensure apps are working as users expect

➼ These contracts make sure OEMs give you bimonthly security updates — “no less than 6 security updates in a calendar year.”

Google also pointed out that companies beyond Epic have managed to get their apps preinstalled on Android phones, like Facebook and LinkedIn. I now wonder what Meta, Microsoft, and OEMs paid or gave up for that to happen.

I’m receptive to this argument: we at The Verge have decried fragmentation and bloatware for years, often asking why OEMs insist on reinventing the wheel by bundling apps that perform worse than the de facto platform defaults. But I didn’t know Google paid so much to keep it from being so.

Comments include:

“Lack of honesty at Android leadership. Lie to your face and stab you in the back.”

“I am loyal to Google; not any person”

“Andy Rubin culture is rampant; but more passive aggressive, and not out in the open”

“Why am I doing this? To protect Joan the billionaire?”

“Why am I defending these people?”

He also mentions protecting “Jamie,” who we’ve heard is his boss, Jamie Rosenberg... and who just so happens to be testifying after him in court today.

Samsung’s counteroffer included: “Utilize Google IAP as the main payment module on Galaxy Store.” Samsung was willing to give Google a cut of in-app purchases, that means.

Instead, Google did three other deals with Samsung in 2020 worth $8 billion, Kolotouros agreed. We didn’t get all the details.

“Play Store will still be distributed and placed on the default home screen for all devices via the MADA, but there is room for Samsung to also add the Galaxy Store,” reads an executive summary. “This saves us $1.0B over 4 years.”

That’s why, in February 2019, Google proposed Project Banyan, aka “How do we continue to keep Play as the preeminent distribution platform for Android?” Or at least that’s the first page of a slide deck about Banyan.

It was a short-lived attempt: after Samsung’s June 2019 counteroffer, Google gave up on it, Kolotouros says.

“They needed permission in form of a waiver from Google to do this, yes?” Yes, answered Kolotouros. The only way to preload was to give up its Premier rev share, he agreed.

Update: here’s a summary of Google’s rebuttal.

10 percent of “net optimized ad revenue”

5 percent of “net optimized Play transaction revenue”

15 percent of “net premier ad revenue”

20 percent of “net Play transaction revenue”

This is from Google and OnePlus’ RSA 3.0 agreement.

Google planned to specifically offer revenue to phone manufacturers to “secure Play exclusivity,” among other things:

And as we’re seeing now, Google went through with these deals, calling them RSA 3.0.