Lauren Feiner

The company invested extra to make sure it’s infrastructure wouldn’t melt down if TikTok were suddenly to go dark in the US after the ban took effect. Meta feared that “the flood in traffic of all those users coming to Reels … could potentially overwhelm our data centers to the point that our site would go down,” Olivan testifies. The company was already aware that Reels usage is higher in India, for example, where TikTok is banned.

All social network apps have to do to figure out who their users are connected with is ask for permission to read the address book on their phones, Olivan says, which is something most do when users first join an app. This pushes back on the FTC’s theory about the importance of network effects to Meta’s dominance — meaning that the more users are on a platform, the more value it has to those users.

Rather than stifle Instagram, Olivan testifies that Meta wanted the app to thrive after it acquired it. In a 2012 email after the acquisition was announced, Olivan said the startup founders were “barely being able to keep the site up & running” because of the influx of sign-ups. He suggested helping the app with translations and analytics that would help it grow, using existing frameworks that Facebook had already used.

Olivan says “there was no signs of them morphing into anything else” besides a replacement for SMS messaging. Besides the founders’ distaste for social features, Olivan says that the way WhatsApp grew outside the US — through arbitrage of high international telecom SMS fees — didn’t exist in the US. He flatly testifies that Meta did not buy WhatsApp because it feared the app becoming a social network competitor.

Even though the 2018 data scandal led users to view Facebook’s brand more negatively, Olivan concedes it had a relatively lower impact on users actually deactivating their accounts. The FTC seems to be positioning this as a measure of Meta’s alleged monopoly power, since the ability to raise prices without losing customers is a common indicator of such power.

Facebook has at points worried about cannibalizing its flagship platform by promoting users moving to Instagram. Instagram co-founder Kevin Systrom described this in his testimony as Meta depriving Instagram of resources to favor Facebook Blue. But Olivan says it’s okay for one side of the business to shrink a little if growth expands overall. “As long as this one grows much more, I’m willing to take a little hit on the other one,” he says.

“Out of all the potential buyers, I thought Google and Apple would be the worst ones because they already ran the operating systems of the phones,” Olivan testifies. They were “particularly dangerous acquirers because they have an unfair advantage on us” by running the underlying operating system, he says.

Olivan describes a “huge chain of ifs” that might have led Google to becoming a significant social player in at least some countries around the world, had it acquired WhatsApp — something he and other Facebook execs feared in 2012. Two of those “ifs” would be if Google would run a social app without killing it, and whether it could convince WhatsApp’s founders to add social features, which they infamously resisted.

“The plan was to figure it out down the line,” Olivan testifies about the $19 billion acquisition. After all, he says. “Mark didn’t have a plan for how to monetize Facebook when he started it, either.”

In 2013, the company’s-then director of corporate development Amin Zoufonoun wrote that perhaps Facebook needs “a separate, free sms focused and branded messenger product to compete in this space if we cannot buy whatsapp. Zoufonoun worried “that FB messenger, with its legacy connotations may not do it in the space defined by whatsapp no matter what we do.” Olivan, who had recently taken over the Messenger team, advocated for improving the existing app, instead.